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Efforts at the IMO to Pass Necessary Regulations.
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Capacity for Dispute Resolution
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ABSTRACT
Climate change is causing Arctic ice to melt at an alarming
rate. But rapid changes in the Arctic are also raising pressing
challenges to the Arctic States collective management of the
region, exercised through the Arctic Council. The first is a greater
number of players entering the region, each with its own claims
to a share of the Arctics newly accessible oil reserves or to
various bits of land or to newly navigable cost-effective shipping
routes. The second is that increased shipping traffic brings
greater environmental risks to Arctic States coastlines, marine
life, indigenous communities, and fishing stocks. These twin
challenges are becoming linked by the ways in which regional and
external actors are using environmental concerns to justify their
actions inor access tothe region.
Contrary to growing fears of conflict in the Arctic, however,
this Article argues that the Arctic Council framework, together
with the widely-recognized international law of the sea, give the
Arctic States functional tools to resolve conflict. This Article
evaluates existing dispute settlement mechanismsincluding the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the UNCLOS
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelfand
recommends that the Arctic States, through the Arctic Council,
rely on these mechanisms to strengthen inter-state dispute
settlement. In creating a strategy for a stable Arctic, relying on
existing mechanisms is in the Arctic States collective best interest
because they are efficientthe Arctic Councils structure enables
it to implement relevant UN conventionsand carry international
legitimacy as part of the framework of existing treaty regimes.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is bringing the once-frozen Arctic to a boil. In 2019,
the U.S. Department of Defense published a report on its Arctic Strategy
by request of Congress, responding to increasing concerns that new
waterways made accessible by melting ice will result in militarization of
the Arctic.1 Russia, whose coastline dominates half the Arctic Ocean, has
been reopening, fortifying, and building new military bases in the Arctic
region and publicizing [its] military exercises there.2 The buildup has
drawn comparisons to Russias seizure of Crimea, with the inference that
Russia may be just as willing to seize territory in the Arctic.3
In response, U.S. intelligence agencies have assigned new analysts to
monitor the Arctic full-time.4 In 2017, the United States deployed 300
Marines to Norwaythe first time since World War Two that foreign
troops have been allowed to be stationed there.5 And, just as Russia
maintains bases along newly emerging coastline, so does Canada: its
northernmost base, Alert, is located closer to Moscow than to Ottawa.6
There has also been a rush to build new icebreakers, ships with fortified
hulls capable of traversing icy waters that remain part solid, part liquid.7

1. The report was an updated version of a previous 2016 strategy. OFF. OF THE UNDER
SECY OF DEF. FOR POLY, REP. TO CONG.: DEPT OF DEF. ARCTIC STRATEGY (June 2019),
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTICSTRATEGY.PDF [https://perma.cc/UXE3-F8MV].
2. Johnny Harris, Its time to draw borders on the Arctic Ocean, VOX: BORDERS (Oct.
24, 2017), https://youtu.be/Wx_2SVm9Jgo [https://perma.cc/4A77-GDAL]; see Andrew
Osborn, Putins Russia in biggest Arctic military push since Soviet fall, REUTERS (Jan. 30,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-insight/putins-russia-in-biggest-ar
ctic-military-push-since-soviet-fall-idUSKBN15E0W0 [https://perma.cc/MU3N-24NP].
3. Osborn, supra note 2; see Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, Looking
North: Sharpening Americas Arctic Focus (Rovaniemi, Finland, May 6, 2019) (transcript
available at https://2017-2021.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/
index.html [https://perma.cc/F2TC-7TA6] ([W]e know Russian territorial ambitions can
turn violent.).
4. Brian Bennett & W.J. Hennigan, U.S. builds up Arctic spy network as Russia and
China increase presence, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/
world/europe/la-fg-arctic-spy-20150907-story.html [https://perma.cc/9J9H-UU8Y].
5. Osborn, supra note 2.
6. James Kraska, International Security and International Law in the Northwest
Passage, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 1109, 1119 (2009).
7. Marc Lanteigne, The Changing Shape of Arctic Security, NATO REV. (June 28,
2019), https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/06/28/the-changing-shape-of-arc
tic-security/index.html [https://perma.cc/92Z3-6YE2].
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Even as the Arctic ice slowly melts, floating chunks of ice can still sink a
ship.8
Contrary to fears of conflict in the Arctic, however, this Article argues
that the Arctic Council framework, together with the widely-recognized
international law of the sea, make the Arctic a highly stable region with
functional tools to resolve disputes. The Arctic States are those with
landmass in the Arctic Circle: Canada, Denmark (which administers
Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United
States.9 Five of these eight, the coastal states, have coastline touching
the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United
States). Through the consensus-based structure of the Arctic Council, all
of the Arctic States are collectively involved in cooperation schemes for
protection of the marine environment and emergency response in the
Arctic, among others. The Arctic Council is the only formal grouping of
states that meets regularly for intergovernmental consultation on Arctic
issues.10
It is not the military buildup which should alarm observers, as new
bases likely have a defensive posture on newly-exposed coastline. Rather,
states purported claims to protect the environments of their coastlines or
even the ecosystem of the Arctic more broadly may be used as convenient
decoys for expanding or sustaining claims to territorial access contrary to
international law. These expansive claims are what can ultimately lead to
intractable conflict in the Arctic.
As melting ice opens greater access to the Arctic Ocean, the region
will be confronted with two major challenges. The first is a greater number
of players entering the region, each with its own claim either to a share of
the Arctics oil reserves, or to various bits of land, or to access to newly
navigable waterways that will serve as cost-effective shipping routes. The
U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic contains 30 percent of all
the undiscovered natural gas in the world;11 as these untapped reserves
become more accessible, states far from the Arctic are maneuvering to
ensure they can cultivate some of these resources themselves. The second
major challenge to the Arctic States is that increased shipping traffic plus
8. Dimitri Touren, The Arctic: Low tensions in high latitudes, LE J. INTL (July 13,
2016), https://www.lejournalinternational.fr/The-Arctic-Low-tensions-in-high-latitudes_
a3687.html [https://perma.cc/KXD6-RDL3].
9. This paper will refer to these states collectively as the Arctic States, as they are
designated in the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, discussed infra.
10. ARCTIC COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL,
OTTAWA, CANADA, ¶ 9, Sept. 19, 1996, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/
11374/85 [https://perma.cc/9NHU-FB5P] [hereinafter Ottawa Declaration].
11. Harris, supra note 2.
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increased fossil fuel extraction inevitably bring greater environmental
risks to their coastlines, marine life, indigenous communities, and fishing
stocks. These two challenges are becoming linked by the variety of ways
in which regional and external actors are jockeying for position over
claims in the region.
I. DRAMATIS PERSONAE: THE ACTORS PLAYING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS WITH TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
The international law of the sea, codified in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),12 explains many of the
Arctic States actions, and therefore, sketching key provisions is critical to
understanding them. Under Article 3 of UNCLOS, every coastal state has
the right to establish a territorial sea measuring 12 nautical miles (nm)
from its territorial baseline, normally measured as the low-water line along
its coast.13 A coastal state may exercise regulatory control to prevent
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws up to an
additional 12 nm in what is known as the contiguous zone.14 A coastal state
has additional rights in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which stretches
200 nm from its baseline.15 Within the EEZ, a state has exclusive rights for
the purpose of exploring and conserving natural resources,16 constructing
or authorizing the construction of artificial islands,17 as well as the right to
determine the allowable catch of living resources.18
Ships of all states are permitted innocent passage through another
states territorial sea.19 However, such passage is expected to be
continuous and expeditious and without activities that threaten peace or
good order, such as intelligence collection or fishing.20 The coastal state
may still regulate innocent passage for the safety of navigation and
conservation of living resources.21 The coastal state also has obligations
12. Although UNCLOS is a treaty, many states, including the United States, view the
convention as a codification of some (if not all) of customary international law applicable
to the high seas.
13. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, art. 3, [hereinafter UNCLOS].
14. Id. art. 33.
15. Id. art. 57.
16. Id. art. 56(1)(a).
17. Id. art. 60.
18. Id. art. 61(1).
19. LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 1329 (7th ed. 2019) (quoting UNCLOS art. 17).
20. Id. at 1329-30 (quoting UNCLOS arts. 18, 19).
21. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 21(1).
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within its territorial waters, including a duty to warn of any known
danger[s] to navigation.22
By contrast, ships of foreign states do not have the right to enter a
states internal waters.23 However, states might have a right of innocent
passage if the waters had not previously been considered internal.24
Freedom of navigation through international straits, known as transit
passage under UNCLOS, has long been recognized in customary
international laweven for military vessels.25 International straits were
defined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel
case as straits connecting two parts of the high seas that are used for
international navigation.26 Although transit passage, like innocent
passage, must be expeditious,27 it requires respect of only international
law rather than the domestic laws and regulations of the states bordering
the straits.28
As for resources below the oceansuch as natural gasUNCLOS
provides for a states claim to sovereignty over its continental shelf,
defined as the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend
beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory [ . . . ] to a distance of 200 [nm].29 A states rights can extend
further, to an outer continental shelf, if the shelf itself naturally
continues beyond that point.30 The UNCLOS Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is the body tasked with receiving
applications from states and issuing non-binding recommendations on the
delimitation of states continental shelves.31
Russia and Canada are the largest players in the Arctic Ocean by
amount of coastline. They also exert the most control over the two main
shipping routes through the Arctic Ocean, the Northern Sea Route and the
22. Id. art. 24(2); see DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 19, at 1330.
23. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 8 (defining internal waters as waters on the landward
side of the baseline of the territorial sea[,] which includes bays and lakes); see DAMROSCH
& MURPHY, supra note 19, at 1323.
24. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 8.
25. See Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 15, at 29 (Apr. 9) (finding that Albania
could be justified in regulating transit passage of warships in exceptional circumstances,
but could not prohibit passage or subject warships to the requirement of special
authorization.).
26. Henri Féron, A New Ocean: The Legal Challenges of the Arctic Thaw, 45 ECOLOGY
L. Q. 83, 95 (2018).
27. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 39(1)(a).
28. Féron, supra note 26, at 95.
29. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 76(1).
30. Féron, supra note 26, at 101.
31. Id. at 100.
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Northwest Passage. However, outside actors also have claims of access to
resources and navigation in parts of the Arctic Ocean. This has led some
to claim that Arctic issues are global, not regional.
A. Russia
The Arctic has both economic and geostrategic significance for
Russia.32 The natural gas which Russia can already access has produced as
much as twenty percent of Russias GDP.33 Russia claims an outer
continental shelf, which overlaps with Canadas and Denmarks own
continental shelf claims.34
Most importantly, one of the two shipping routes through the Arctic
Ocean, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), runs through Russias EEZ and at
various points also enters Russian internal waters or territorial sea.35
Russia has used this as a basis to implement environmental protection
regulations permitted in ice-covered areas under Article 234 of
UNCLOS.36 These include charging transiting ships a fee for mandatory
ice-breaker escort from the Russian breaker fleet.37 In 2019, then-U.S.
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo called additional Russian
requirementsthe forced boarding of transiting ships by Russian pilots
and threats to use military force against ships that do not comply
illegal.38
Given that the Arctic is central to the Russian economy, its most recent
Arctic strategy document sets goals for developing infrastructure like

32. Russia stands to gain economically from the thawing of the Arctic region generally,
which is opening a vast amount of cultivatable farmland in eastern Russia. Abrahm
Lustgarten, How Russia Wins the Climate Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/12/16/magazine/russia-climate-migrationcrisis.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/D4DP-HAXK].
33. Kraska, supra note 6, at 1116.
34. Juha Käpylä & Harri Mikkola, Arctic Conflict Potential: Towards an Extra-Arctic
Perspective, THE FIN. INST. OF INTL AFFS. BRIEFING PAPER 138, at 4-5 (Sept. 2013),
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/170344/bp138.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN8S-5KC9]; see also
UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 74.
35. Käpylä & Mikkola, supra note 34, at 4.
36. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 234 (Coastal States have the right to adopt and
enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control
of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the [EEZ],
where . . . the presence of ice . . . create[s] obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation . . . ˮ).
37. Käpylä & Mikkola, supra note 34, at 4.
38. Pompeo, supra note 3.
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seaports.39 This strategy has suffered setbacks as sanctions have prevented
U.S. and European companies from financing Russian Arctic development
projects.40 As a result, economic cooperation is likely to be at the center of
Russias priorities as it takes the rotating Arctic Council Chairmanship
from 2021-2023.41 For this reason, one security expert said, [w]e can
expect Moscow to keep tensions low in the High North.42
Russias quick response to the biggest oil spill in the Arctic to date
due to a Russian mining companymay have betrayed a recognition that
an environmental disaster in the Arctic could threaten the states
credibility among regional actors hypersensitive to environmental
dangers.43
B. Canada
Despite the more recent attention Russias activities in the Arctic have
received from American observers,44 Canada was the first Arctic state to
declare controversial territorial claims over large swathes of the Arctic
Ocean.45 Although Canada is more likely to disagree with Russia over their
overlapping continental shelf claims, it also has a long-running dispute
with the United States over the Northwest Passage (NWP).46
The NWP is the second of two main routes through the Arctic Ocean.
Transit of goods through the NWP, connecting the Pacific to the Atlantic,
could save two weeks of travel compared to current shipping routes which
39. Hilde-Gunn Bye, Russias Updated Arctic Strategy: New Strategic Planning
Document Approved, HIGH NORTH NEWS (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.
highnorthnews.com/en/russias-updated-arctic-strategy-new-strategic-planning-documentapproved#:~:text=The%20Strategy%20for%20Development%20outlines,of%20the%20
Northern%20Sea%20Route [https://perma.cc/L95U-G44Q].
40. Féron, supra note 26, at 120.
41. See Bye, supra note 39.
42. Bye, supra note 39.
43. See Yuliya Fedorinova, Ilya Arkhipov, & Olga Tanas, Putins Fury Over Norilsk
Spill May Force Green Reform in Russia, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-11/putin-s-fury-over-norilsk-spillmay-force-green-reform-in-russia [https://perma.cc/3HU6-MYBM].
44. See, e.g., Megan Eckstein, New Arctic Strategy Calls for Regular Presence as a
Way to Compete with Russia, China, USNI NEWS (Jan. 5, 2021), https://news.
usni.org/2021/01/05/new-arctic-strategy-calls-for-regular-presence-as-a-way-to-competewith-russia-china [https://perma.cc/K4LP-NRVK].
45. Kraska, supra note 6, at 1118.
46. Former U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo suggested Canadas sovereignty claim over
the NWP continues to be illegitimate at a 2019 meeting of the Arctic Council. Pompeo,
supra note 3.
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use the Panama and Suez Canals.47 The route navigates through straits
between the Canadian mainland and the Arctic Archipelago, a series of
islands over which Canada has complete sovereignty.48 Because of this,
Canada has drawn its territorial baselines from the archipelago and
claimed that the waters of the NWP are actually internal waters.49
However, Canadas claim that the NWP is part of internal waters
depends to an extent on other states having considered them internal
waters. The increasing rate of international shipping transiting the NWP
could undermine Canadas claim.50 Conversely, if Canada succeeds in
advancing this claim, the NWP could become a highly regulated trade
route, more like a canal than a strait. As indigenous communities foment
increasing political pressure at home,51 the concerns of indigenous
communitiesincluding those living in the archipelagocould gain
increased salience in Canadas internal politics and Canadas position on
the NWP could harden as a result.
Canada has a long history of enforcing environmental regulations
within and beyond its EEZ, which other states have assailed as contrary to
international law. In 1995, Canadian officials intercepted, boarded, and
arrested the master of a fishing vessel flying the Spanish flag on the high
seas in an area outside of Canadas EEZ.52 The European Community,53 in
a strongly-worded diplomatic note, declared that Canada was flagrantly
violating international law [and] failing to observe normal behaviour of
responsible States.54 For its part, Canada claimed jurisdiction for the
action based on a national law, which extended the jurisdiction of its
fisheries protection officers into an area that is on the high seas and
permitted officers to board and search vessels found in that area in order

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Kraska, supra note 6, at 1124.
Id. at 1126.
See id. at 1119, 1126-27; see also UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 47.
Kraska, supra note 6, at 1119.
See Taylor C. Noakes, 2020 Was the Year of Indigenous Activism in Canada,
FOREIGN POLY (Dec. 17, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/17/2020-indigenousactivism-canada-trudeau/ [https://perma.cc/N6CR-44K6].
52. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 1998 I.C.J. 443, ¶¶ 19-20 (Spain argued
that, under Article 92 of UNCLOS, Spain had exclusive jurisdiction over the ship because
it was on the high seas and flying its flag, and that Canada did not have jurisdiction to board
a foreign vessel on the high seas) [hereinafter Fisheries Jurisdiction Case].
53. The European Community was a predecessor organization to the European Union.
E.g., Matthew J. Gabel, European Community, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/European-Community-European-economic-association
[https://perma.cc/9UZR-7M6Z ] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
54. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case at 444, ¶ 20.
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to prevent the destruction of fishing stocks.55 Although Spain brought a
claim before the ICJ, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the
dispute.56
Prior to the conclusion of UNCLOS, in 1970, Canada enacted a similar
law, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which prohibited waste
discharge and ordered extensive regulations within 100 miles from the
northern coast of Canada.57 Some have posited that states have such
authority based on custodial jurisdiction over contiguous zones,
claiming an international interest in preserving the environment.58 But
international law does not recognize such a basis for asserting
jurisdiction.59
C. United States
U.S. insistence on free navigation through the NWPas transit
passage rather than innocent passageis consistent with its position
regarding international straits in other regions, such as the South China
Sea. Indeed, U.S. policymakers have been criticized for comparing the two
very different regions.60 Some commentators have suggested that the U.S.
wants to avoid an outcome in the Arctic that could set legal precedent
adverse to U.S. positions elsewhere, including the South China Sea.61 Even
if this bolsters the UNCLOS regime, it also has the effect of imputing
extra-regional concerns into Arctic governance.
Concerns external to the Arctic also threaten to intrude on U.S.Russia
cooperation in the Arctic. Due to Alaskas position along the Bering Strait,
which is the access-point to the Arctic Ocean from the Pacific, the United
States is poised to manage all traffic transiting the fifty-two-mile-wide
chokepoint.62 But it will have to manage this traffic in partnership with
Russia, whose coastline makes up the other side of the chokepoint. Given
tensions between the two states, external events could invade U.S.
decision-making on this aspect of Arctic governance. A 2014 tacit
55. Id. at 439-40, ¶ 15 (quoting provisions of Canadas Coastal Fisheries Protection
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-33 (Can.)).
56. Id. at 467, ¶ 87. Canada had amended its consent to ICJ jurisdiction to exempt
matters arising from these very conservation measures. Id. at 438-39, ¶¶ 14-15.
57. Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basis for Creation of a New Method of Defining
International Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, 13 MO. ENVT L. & POLY REV. 1, 7 (2005).
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id.
60. Lanteigne, supra note 7.
61. Käpylä & Mikkola, supra note 34, at 4.
62. Kraska, supra note 6, at 1123-24.
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agreement among the Arctic Council members to exclude external
political and security concerns from the Councils deliberations may
forestall this possibility.63 But experts expect that conflicts elsewhere will
spill over because the Arctic is not an insulated security space.64
The United States also risks falling prey to Arctic alarmismfears
of military aggression that prompt an Arctic arms race.65 But its
submarines consistently outclass Russias submarine fleet, and NATOs
combined naval forces outnumber Russias Cold Warera Northern
Fleet.66 Despite disagreement with Canada, the United States has advanced
joint Arctic policy with its northern ally.67 Moreover, the two states have
integrated air defense through North American Air Defense (NORAD) for
decades.68
Finally, although the United States is actively conducting the research
necessary to submit a continental shelf claim extending from Alaska,69 it
is unclear whether the CLCS will accept the U.S. application or issue a
recommendation to a non-party to UNCLOS.70 The United States may also
find it increasingly difficult to base its positions in disputes with Russia,
Canada, or others on UNCLOS as it remains a non-party to the convention.
D. Norway, India, and the Svalbard Treaty
Like Canada, Norway has been an active environmental regulator in
the Arctic. In 2020, Norway announced that it will ban the use of heavy
fuel oil in the waters surrounding the Svalbard archipelago.71 As of 2015,
63. Lanteigne, supra note 7.
64. Katarzyna Zysk, Looking North: Conference on Security in the Arctic, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IJzOKvD7WgA
[https://perma.cc/XBC2-45L5].
65. Robert David English & Morgan Grant Gardner, Phantom Peril in the Arctic:
Russia Doesnt Threaten the United States in the Far NorthBut Climate Change Does,
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/
2020-09-29/phantom-peril-arctic [https://perma.cc/BU42-DQPK].
66. Id.
67. Mark P. Nevitt & Robert V. Percival, Polar Opposites: Assessing the State of
Environmental Law in the Worlds Polar Regions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1655, 1666-67 (2018).
68. Kraska, supra note 6, at 1120.
69. See U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, https://www.
state.gov/u-s-extended-continental-shelf-project/ [https://perma.cc/JCT5-78SP]
(last visited Feb 2, 2022).
70. See Nevitt & Percival, supra note 67, at 1659, 1691; see also discussion of
UNCLOS, supra note 13.
71. Norway Moves to Ban Carriage of HFO in Waters Near Svalbard, MAR. EXEC.
(Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/norway-moves-to-ban-carr
iage-of-hfo-in-waters-near-svalbard [https://perma.cc/S9PW-BMFF].
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over eighty percent of Svalbards marine area, including fjords, is
protected nature reserves.72 Russia has lodged a complaint with Norway
over its artificial expansion of nature protection zones, arguing that its
regulation within the 200-mile EEZ around Svalbard is inconsistent with
the shared nature of the archipelago.73
Norway gained sovereignty over Svalbard under the 1920 Svalbard
Treaty, but all contracting partieswhich include all the Arctic States and
states as far from the Arctic as Egypt, Argentina, and Japan74enjoy equal
rights to the archipelagos territorial waters and to use the land for
commercial purposes.75 No state, including Norway, may use Svalbard for
military purposes.76
One prominent signatory to the Svalbard Treaty is India, which has
conducted research from its Himadri research station on Svalbard.77 India
received observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013 and even published
a draft Arctic policy in 2021.78 While its presence on Svalbard is a
legitimate exercise of its treaty rights, Indias Arctic policy couches its
research in terms of the impact that changes in the Arctic will have on
monsoon patterns and the global ecosystem.79
E. China
China has defined itself as a near-Arctic state, released its own
Arctic policy in 2018, and in 2013 gained observer status at the Arctic
Council.80 Chinas ability to provide economic incentives to the Arctic
72. Øystein Overrein, Svalbards Protected Areas, NOR. POLAR INST.: CRUISE
HANDBOOK FOR SVALBARD (May 2015), http://cruise-handbook.npolar.no/en/
svalbard/protected-areas.html [https://perma.cc/V3QR-DVYF].
73. Norway Clarifies Svalbard Treaty After Russian Complaint, THE MARITIME
EXECUTIVE (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/norwayclarifies-svalbard-treaty-after-russian-complaint [https://perma.cc/ZL5G-4VZB].
74. Id.
75. Svalbard Treaty, Feb. 9, 1920, 43 Stat. 1892, 2 L.N.T.S. 184,
https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-11/svalbard-treaty.xml
[https://perma.cc/7M34-T82Z].
76. Id. at art. I.
77. Sahana Ghosh & Mayank Aggarwal, With a new policy, India aims to understand
the impact of the Arctic region on its monsoon, QUARTZ INDIA (Jan. 24, 2021),
https://qz.com/india/1939274/indias-arctic-policy-to-focus-on-climate-change-monsoonrains/ [https://perma.cc/BP5T-K2RS].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. GISELA GRIEGER, CHINAS ARCTIC POLICY: HOW CHINA ALIGNS RIGHTS AND
INTEREST 2 (European Parliamentary Research Service, May 2018), https://www.euro
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States is readily apparent; it is one of the biggest mining investors in
Greenland, and its acceptance as an observer state on the Council was due
in part to encouragement from Iceland, which concluded a free trade deal
with China in 2013.81 The Arctics poorer states such as Iceland are
welcoming the investments of outside actors.82 But merely by gaining
observer status, China has achieved symbolic recognition that nonregional states have legitimate interests in the region.83
China seeks to integrate Arctic shipping routes into its global
economic and geopolitical strategy known as the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), referring to Arctic trade routes as the Polar Silk Road.84 It has
been cooperating with Russia in developing these routes,85 and a Chinese
shipping company sends vessels through the NSR each year.86
Like India, China also has spent significant resources on research
initiatives in the Arctic, including building three research stations.87
Indeed, China spends more on Arctic research than the United States.88
However, a European Parliament report on Chinas Arctic policy
concludes that this research supports geostrategic goalsincluding
resource extraction and advancing Chinese satellite technology to improve
navigation and missile positioningrather than developing knowledge of
climate change.89
parl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/620231/EPRS_BRI(2018)620231_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZWK2-AUC8].
81. See Patricia Zengerle, China granted observer seat on Arctic governing council,
REUTERS (May 15, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-arctic-council/chinagranted-observer-seat-on-arctic-governing-council-idUSBRE94E0IJ20130515
[https://perma.cc/KX6W-NRP6]; Matthew D. Stephen & Kathrin Stephen, The Integration
of Emerging Powers into Club Institutions: China and the Arctic Council, 11 GLOBAL
POLY 51, 58 (Oct. 2020), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1758-5899.
12834 [https://perma.cc/QK4G-PYG3].
82. David Auerswald, Chinas Multifaceted Arctic Strategy, WAR ON THE ROCKS (May
24, 2019), https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/chinas-multifaceted-arctic-strategy/
[https://perma.cc/ASJ4-X2D6].
83. See Stephen & Stephen, supra note 81, at 55-56.
84. GRIEGER, supra note 80, at 5.
85. Id.
86. Alec Luhn, Freezing cold war: militaries move in as Arctic ice retreats, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/oct/16/arctic
-ice-retreats-climate-us-russian-canadian-chinese-military
[https://perma.cc/R38J-LUGL].
87. China vies for seat at council on Arctic resources and trade routes, PRI (July 31,
2012), https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-07-31/china-vies-seat-council-arctic-resourcesand-trade-routes [https://perma.cc/W44V-3MBU].
88. Stephen & Stephen, supra note 81, at 56.
89. Grieger, supra note 80, at 5-6.
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Although China reassured the Arctic States through its 2018 Arctic
policy that it is committed to existing legal frameworks, including
UNCLOS, this is contrary to Chinas own recent history in disregarding
the Permanent Court of Arbitrations 2016 decision, based on UNCLOS,
that rejected Chinas claims in the South China Sea.90 China has also stated
that its goals in the Arctic are to build a community with a shared future
for mankind, which the European Parliament report suggests is not mere
rhetoric, but policy language that fits into its broader BRI framework.91
F. European Union
The European Union (EU) is also taking an active role in developing
Arctic policy, though the contours of its involvement are still evolving.92
Although China and others gained observer status at the Arctic Council in
2013, Canada blocked the EUs application.93 The EU potentially stands
to gain the most from new shipping routes through the Arctic. The cost
savings of faster transit times between the Atlantic and Pacific will be
especially beneficial to European and Asian nations.94 For the EU, this
also means more direct access to the emerging and expanding markets in
East Asia.
While it cannot necessarily be said to be an outside actor (Denmark,
which administers Greenland, and Sweden and Finland, noncoastal Arctic
States, are EU members), the EU seems to embrace a Global Arctic
model of international engagement with the region, potentially putting it
at odds with Arctic States.95 André Gattolin, vice-chair of the French
Senates European Affairs Committee, has authored three EU Arctic

90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 4 (citing Xinhua, Concept of community with shared future for mankind
being transformed into action: Xi, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.china
daily.com.cn/china/2017-12/01/content_35160220.htm [https://perma.cc/FL5N-WXDL].
92. C. Mark Macneill, Splitting Canadas Northern Strategy: Is It Polar Policy Mania?,
20 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POLY 13, 15 (2020).
93. Matt McGrath, China joins Arctic Council but a decision on the EU is deferred,
BBC NEWS (May 15, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-22527822
[https://perma.cc/2S5H-HEDC].
94. Kraska, supra note 6, at 1124.
95. See id.
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reports and recently opined that [m]any issues have globalised the
Arctic.96 Top [of these] is climate change, Gattolin wrote.97
*

*

*

This is not an exhaustive list of territorial disputes in the Arctic.
Rather, it illustrates a handful of disputes and potential disputes where
there is overlap between environmental concerns and international
boundaries, and where external considerations may creep into legal
resolutions of these disputes as they develop. Even while highlighting how
environmental protection claims might be manipulated by state and
regional actors, however, it is important to note the very real
environmental concerns that exist in the fragile ecosystem of the Arctic.
II. THE REAL ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS
The Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the planet,98
meaning that the effects of climate change will be felt faster in the Arctic
than anywhere else. Melting landmass and sinking permafrost will require
the relocation of coastal communities and costly repairs to infrastructure.99
As one former defense analyst warned, a rapidly warming Arctic will be
the locus of a cascading series of environmental, economic, and public
health disasters.100
Despite the growing number of cargo ships transiting the NSR,
shifting weather patterns could actually make the Arctic less accessible in
the future.101 Yet, the number of ships entering the Arctic area grew by 25

96. André Gattolin & Damien Degeorges, Opinion, High geopolitics in the High North:
A call for a deeper EU engagement, EURACTIV (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.
euractiv.com/section/arctic-agenda/opinion/high-geopolitics-in-the-high-north-a-call-fora-deeper-eu-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/KH8K-BYFT].
97. Id.
98. Nevitt & Percival, supra note 67, at 1662.
99. See English & Gardner, supra note 65.
100. Id.
101. Zysk, supra note 64.
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percent from 2013 to 2019, according to the Arctic Councils first Arctic
Shipping Status Report.102 The ships are also sailing farther distances.103
Shipping contributes both to the climate change causing the warming
of the Arctic in the first place, and to the risk of oil spills in the ecologically
sensitive region. Todays ships are powered by high-carbon fuel, more
commonly known as bunker fuel, which is by far the most polluting fuel
variant used in commercial operation, according to two environmental
law experts.104 Many of the ships operating in the Arctic are also
transporting oil and natural gas. Not only could a damaged ship leak its
own fuel, but it could also leak its cargo. Oil spills are especially difficult
to clean up in the Arctic because the cold prevents oil from breaking up,
letting it linger in the ecosystem far longer.105 As more ships operate in
narrow ice-choked sea lanes, the risks attendant with collisions
including both economic loss and the harms of an oil spillincrease.
Economically, the warming of the Arctic could result in the loss of
species sustaining current indigenous communities.106 Conversely, easier
access to Arctic fishing stocks could also lead to overfishing, which
brought the five Arctic coastal states, Iceland, the EU, China, Japan, and
South Korea together to sign a legally binding 16-year moratorium on
commercial fishing until they can create mechanisms to preserve the
fishing stocks.107
The Arctic could also be the source of the next global pandemic.108
In 2016, an anthrax outbreak in Siberia, believed to have spread from a
thawed reindeer carcass infected with the bacteria, prompted the Russian
government to airlift families out of the area.109 Researchers expect that

102. ARCTIC COUNCIL PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT, THE
INCREASE IN ARCTIC SHIPPING 2013-2019, 10 (ARCTIC SHIPPING STATUS REPORT (ASSR)
#1, Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.pame.is/document-library/pame-reports-new/pameministerial-deliverables/2021-12th-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting-reykjavikiceland/793-assr-1-the-increase-in-arctic-shipping-2013-2019/file
[https://perma.cc/2LR7-ANZ8].
103. Id.
104. Harsha Pisupati & Armin Rosencranz, The Deteriorating Arctic and the Impact of
the Shipping Industry, 49 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10837, 10838 (2019).
105. See Dubner, supra note 57, at 15.
106. See English & Gardner, supra note 65.
107. Grieger, supra note 80, at 6.
108. English & Gardner, supra note 65.
109. Michaeleen Doucleff, Anthrax Outbreak In Russia Thought To Be Result Of
Thawing Permafrost, NPR (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/
2016/08/03/488400947/anthrax-outbreak-in-russia-thought-to-be-result-of-thawingpermafrost [https://perma.cc/HN54-YZ5R].
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other dead animals and buried people frozen in the permafrost will release
other pathogens as climate change warms the preserved bacteria.110
Rising fears of military confrontation in the Arcticwhich would be
environmentally catastrophic for all parties involvedhave obscured the
very real threats that climate change poses to this environmentally
sensitive region.111 Where [u]nseasonal storms will threaten hundreds of
lives and any potential naval conflict would degenerate into harrowing
search-and-rescue missions, [t]he looming catastrophe can be managed
only cooperatively.112
III. THE ARCTIC GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES THAT PROVIDE WAYS TO
MANAGE COMPETING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
OBLIGATIONS
As one commentator has argued, a treaty among the Arctic States
could establish limits to exploitation of the Arctic natural resources, and
institute other environmental standards to preserve the natural landscape
and indigenous populations.113 However, a legal regime already governs
the Arctic. Indeed, the five coastal states tried to preempt attempts at
universalization of the region which could flow from a new treaty
regime.114 They agreed in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration that there is no
need to develop a new legal framework for the Arctic because an
extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean,
including the law of the sea.115
A triumvirate of institutions generally provides governance over the
Arctic. The Arctic Council, as a decision-making and action-oriented body
of the Arctic States, acts as something like an executive. The International
Maritime Organization (IMO), through regulations adopted with the
consent of the Arctic States, provides an equivalent legislative function.
UNCLOS, in setting out rules and dispute resolution mechanisms,
provides a comparable judicial function.

110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Molly Watson, An Arctic Treaty: A Solution to the International Dispute over the
Polar Region, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 307, 330 (2009).
114. Touren, supra note 8.
115. The Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, ¶ 3, https://arcticportal.org/images/
stories/pdf/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DJ3-2KMM].
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A. Arctic Council

Since its founding in 1996, the Arctic Council has evolved from an
informal networking group on Arctic issues into a more or less fullyfledged international organization with a permanent secretariat.116 For
those outside the region maneuvering to access the Arctics resources, the
Council has established itself as the gatekeeper to that access.117
Modern cooperation among the Arctic States began in 1991, when
they adopted the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS),118
which included four programs to coordinate conservation, climate change
monitoring and analysis, and best practices in pollution reduction and
emergency response.119 On September 19, 1996, the Arctic States signed
the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa
Declaration), which absorbed these programs into the new framework of
the Arctic Council.120
Today, there are also a number of observer states, intergovernmental
organizations, and non-governmental organizations,121 whose involvement
in the Council is governed by rules set out in the Arctic Council Observer
Manual.122 Some have posited that the Councils decision to invite
observer states into the Council framework was itself a strategy to retain
leadership of Arctic governance and prevent parallel decision-making
bodies from developing under U.N. or IMO auspices.123 Observers may
propose projects, but their financial funding may not exceed the
116. Stephen & Stephen, supra note 81, at 54.
117. See id. at 55-56.
118. Dubner, supra note 57, at 7; see also CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA:
POLICY, https://www.caff.is/policy-home [https://perma.cc/4UEF-UMSP] (last visited
Feb. 4, 2022).
119. The four programs are: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the Protection of the Arctic Marine
Environment (PAME), and Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response (EPPR).
See Working Groups, ARCTIC COUNCIL, https://arctic-council.org/en/about/workinggroups/ [https://perma.cc/UP3T-YRUC] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
120. See Ottawa Declaration, supra note 10.
121. Observer states include France, Germany, Japan, China, India, and South Korea.
Observers, ARCTIC COUNCIL, https://arctic-council.org/en/about/observers/
[https://perma.cc/96S3-BEZ6] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
122. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER MANUAL FOR SUBSIDIARY BODIES 9
(May 15, 2013), https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/939/EDOCS3020-v1B-Observer-manual-with-addendum-finalized_Oct2016.pdf?sequence=13&isAll
owed=y [https://perma.cc/4RL4-FEHH] [hereinafter ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER
MANUAL].
123. See Stephen & Stephen, supra note 81, at 57-58.
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contributions from the Arctic States.124 And they must [r]ecognize Arctic
States sovereignty [ . . . ] and jurisdiction in the Arctic.125 The rules make
clear that [d]ecisions at all levels [ . . . ] are the exclusive right and
responsibility of the eight Arctic States with the involvement of the
Permanent Participants.126 Still, the Arctic Council retains a flexibility
that a treaty regime would not have by incorporating participation of
indigenous peoples, a community that is not generally invited by states to
participate in formal treaties.127
The Arctic Council is primarily designed as a mechanism for
information-sharing and cooperation on the programs established by the
AEPS, though it has taken on a more structured role in other areas of
cooperation. While the Ottawa Declaration explicitly states that the
Council should not deal with matters related to military security,128 the
Arctic States defense chiefs met biannually until meetings were
suspended following Russias 2014 invasion of Ukraine.129 Despite these
tensions, the Arctic States created the Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2015
to coordinate their regional coast guards.130 Through the Councils
Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response program, the Arctic
States also engage in emergency response exercises.131 Increased
competition between Russia and the United States and growing interest of
outside actorsparticularly Chinain the regions natural resources may
be driving increased attention on the Council, which in turn has formalized
its cooperation structures in response.132
Although the Ottawa Declaration and Council working group
recommendations are non-binding, decisions of the Arctic Council must
be by consensus,133 which ensures a level of consistency in members
positions. The Arctic Council has also become more willing to create
binding legal obligations on its members. In 2011, for example, the
Council adopted the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement; in 2013,
124. See id.
125. See Féron, supra note 26, at 98 (citation omitted).
126. ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER MANUAL, supra note 122, at 6.
127. Although the Arctic States conferred only non-voting permanent participant
status on indigenous peoples, the practice of states has been to exclude indigenous peoples
from formal treaties. See Nevitt & Percival, supra note 67, at 1687 n. 214.
128. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 10, footnote to 1(a).
129. See Käpylä & Mikkola, supra note 34, at 7; see also Féron, supra note 26, at 11819.
130. See Féron, supra note 26, at 118.
131. See EPRR ABOUT, ARCTIC COUNCIL WORKING GROUP, https://eppr.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/T2UG-LGYE] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
132. See Stephen & Stephen, supra note 81, at 54-55.
133. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 10, art. 7.
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members agreed to legally binding cooperation in oil pollution
preparedness and response.134
B. International Maritime Organization
The IMO is a specialized U.N. agency, created by a 1948 convention,
which develops standards to improve safety and prevent pollution in
global shipping.135 IMO committees develop conventions which are made
binding when member states accede to them; the IMO Assembly, made up
of member states, also adopts mandatory resolutions.136 All the Arctic
States are members of the IMO and have acceded to a number of its
conventions.
The 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) is generally considered to be the most important of all
international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships, and
concerns measures such as fire safety, life-saving appliances and radio
communications required onboard, and safety management practices.137
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) contains a number of annexes regulating the carriage of
potentially pollutant chemicals, the discharge of sewage at sea, and other
matters.138 SOLAS and MARPOL are regularly amended to account for
technological changes in shipping and environmental protection.
In 2014, the IMO adopted the International Code for Ships Operating
in Polar Waters (Polar Code), which includes both mandatory and
recommended measures for ship safety and pollution prevention.139
Among other things, the Polar Code requires ships to apply for a Polar
Ship Certificate designating its fitness to operate in the polar environment
134. See Nevitt & Percival, supra note 67, at 1665-66.
135. See Kraska, supra note 6, at 1129; see also Frequently Asked Questions, INTL MAR.
ORG., https://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/FAQs.aspx [https://perma.cc/6BWH-7LT5]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
136. The IMO now oversees more than 50 conventions. See Conventions, INTL MAR.
ORG., https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3TAH-TWW9] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
137. Kraska, supra note 6, at 1129 (citation omitted).
138. See id. at 1130; see also STATUS OF IMO TREATIES, INTL MAR. ORG., (Sept. 29,
2021)
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConven
tions/Status%20-%202021.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW8H-VQZ9].
139. See
Shipping
in
Polar
Waters,
INTL
MAR.
ORG.,
https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Polar-default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 4, 2022); see also The Polar Code, PAME, https://www.pame.is/projects-new/arcticshipping/pame-shipping-highlights/412-arctic-shipping-best-practice-information-forum
[https://perma.cc/YKW3-G8ZK].
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based on inspections.140 The Polar Code is implemented through states
obligations under SOLAS and MARPOL,141 and also includes new rules
for waste disposal, discharges of oil residues, and guidelines for ship
design based on the harsh polar environments.142 More recently, the
IMO also adopted a ban on the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil in the
Arctic, effective in 2024.143
The Arctic States are party to a number of other IMO conventions,
which make additional shipping requirements operative in the Arctic. For
instance, ships and operators of offshore units under the jurisdiction of the
Arctic States are required to have oil pollution emergency plans and to
develop national response systems and procedures for responding to oil
spill incidents.144 The Arctic States implemented these obligations through
their 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution,
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.145 Under the 1972 London
Convention, to which the Arctic States have also acceded, the parties
agreed to take steps to prevent dumping of waste into the oceans and to
harmonize their policies to that end.146 More controversially, the 1969
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties permits a coastal state to take measures
on the high seas that are necessary to prevent, mitigate, or eliminate the

140. See id.
141. The Polar Code is a package of amendments to SOLAS and MARPOL that became
binding in 2017 through a mechanism of those conventions which lets amendments enter
into force after a certain period if no state party objects. Féron, supra note 26, at 108.
142. The Polar Code applies both to the Arctic and Antarctica. See Nevitt & Percival,
supra note 67, at 1688-89.
143. See UN approves ban on heavy ship fuel in Arctic, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/shipping-arctic-imo/un-approves-ban-on-heavy-shipfuel-in-arctic-idUKL8N2HY5IS [https://perma.cc/2B8W-GSJ4]. The Arctic ban follows
Norways regulation to do the same around Svalbard. See Malte Humpert, Norway
announces plans to ban HFO around Svalbard, leapfrogging proposed IMO regulation,
ARCTIC TODAY (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.arctictoday.com/norway-announces-plansto-ban-hfo-around-svalbard-leapfrogging-proposed-imo-regulation/#:~:text=The%20Nor
wegian%20government%20is%20finalizing,of%20HFO%20will%20be%20prohibited
[https://perma.cc/MED2-HWKY].
144. See International Convention on Oil Pollution, Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation, arts. 3, 6, Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 78.
145. See Féron, supra note 26, at 108.
146. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, arts. 1-2, Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/
localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/LC1972.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KLC2-HVHH]. All the Arctic States are parties to the Convention,
though the United States and Russia have not acceded to its additional protocols.
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threat of oil pollution to its coastline following a maritime casualty.147
Notably, Canada, Russia, and the United States have not acceded to this
convention although the other Arctic States have.148
C. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
All of the Arctic States, with the exception of the United States, have
ratified UNCLOS.149 Although the United States has not acceded to
UNCLOS, it did sign the treatys 1994 implementing agreement and
remains a party to its 1958 predecessor Conventions.150 These treaty
obligations, which are largely congruent with UNCLOS, remain binding
on the United States.151
UNCLOS is essentially a set of rules to which state parties have
agreed, though scholars and commentators have indicated ambiguities in
the rules themselves and in their enforcement. A series of UNCLOS
articles require state parties to protect and preserve the marine
environment, cooperate on conservation of living resources, and adopt
measures against pollution.152 But several have noted that UNCLOS is
only a framework for making further commitments, leav[ing] the
substantive content of such anti-pollution measures to the state parties.153
Even a rule specific to the Arctic creates ambiguity which states can
exploit or remain deadlocked on. While states usually must find a violation
within their territorial waters to enforce domestic environmental
regulations on a foreign vessel, Article 234 gives a coastal state extended
jurisdiction and enforcement powers for the protection of the marine
environment in generally ice-covered areas of its EEZ.154 This is the
147. See International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, INTL MAR. ORG., https://www.imo.org/en/About/
Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-Relating-to-Intervention-on-the-High-Seasin-Cases-of-Oil-Pollution-Casualties.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZB4A-S7GL] (last visited
Feb. 4, 2022).
148. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, 970 U.N.T.S. 211.
149. See Nevitt & Percival, supra note 67, at 1690.
150. These include the Conventions on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, on
the High Seas, on the Continental Shelf, and on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas. See DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 19, at 1312, 1315,
1318.
151. See id. at 1318.
152. Féron, supra note 26, at 107 (citing UNCLOS arts. 192, 197, 199, 207-12); see
UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 61.
153. E.g., id.; see Pisupati & Rosencranz, supra note 104, at 10844.
154. Féron, supra note 26, at 107; see UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 234.
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authority claimed by Canada and Russia to implement regulations in the
NWP and NSR, respectively, though the exact scope of these powers
has not been defined.155 Of course, as one law professor observed, Article
234 only permits enhanced marine environmental protection measures
when ice covers the EEZ area for most of the year.156 When ice does not
create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation157 in seven
months out of the year, Canadas and Russias application of pre-existing
measures would be legally dubious.158
Similarly, the CLCS has only recommendatory power because it is not
able to bind states to its findings on the delimitation of continental
shelves.159 While Article 76(8) instructs that recommendations of the
CLCS shall be final and binding, one author has concluded that,
practically speaking, this only binds a state to the limits of its own
submission to the CLCS.160 In fact, according to its own procedures, the
CLCS cannot issue a recommendation on a dispute without the consent of
all the relevant partiesand even then, its recommendation is without
prejudice to their position[s].161 Moreover, it remains unclear whether the
United States has a right at all to submit a claim for the delimitation of its
continental shelf to the CLCS and whether, as a non-party, it would even
be bound by its own submission.162
The delimitation of the Arctic States continental shelves will have
wide-reaching consequences because it will determine which parts of the
Arctic Ocean seabed are left for non-Arctic states to cultivate as the
common heritage of mankind.163 The phrase, to which China has alluded
in its efforts to justify access to Arctic resources, is legally operative under
UNCLOS, carrying rights and duties for UNCLOS members in extracting
resources.164 Benefits derived from a common heritage area are subject
to equitable sharing among states.165
Determining whether the NWP and NSR are international straits or
internal waters may prove the most intractable of these unsettled questions.
155. See Féron, supra note 26, at 107.
156. Donald R. Rothwell, The Law of the Sea and Arctic Governance, 107 AM. SOCY
INTL L. PROC. 272, 275 (2014); UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 234.
157. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 234.
158. Rothwell, supra note 156, at 275.
159. Féron, supra note 26, at 102-03.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 103-04.
162. Nevitt & Percival, supra note 67, at 1691; see id. at 102-03.
163. Féron, supra note 26, at 101; see UNCLOS, supra note 13, pt. XI.
164. See Féron, supra note 26, at 101.
165. See UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 140.
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The answer to this question will decide whether the ships of other states
must comply with Canadas and Russias domestic regulations in innocent
passage, or only generally accepted international regulations in transit
passage.166
UNCLOS provides for compulsory dispute resolution to sort out these
ambiguities. Articles 286 and 287 confer jurisdiction over disputes
regarding the interpretation or application of UNCLOS provisions to four
bodies, at the contracting states choosing: the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, or an arbitral tribunal constituted per Annexes
VII or VIII of UNCLOS.167 Alternatively, Article 282 provides that states
parties can agree to a binding regional or bilateral dispute resolution
procedure of their own, outside the UNCLOS regime.168 And nothing
precludes states parties from agreeing to a peaceful resolution between
themselves,169 such as the 2010 delimitation treaty between Norway and
Russia which ended a long-running dispute in the Barents Sea.170
However, a key problem facing the Arctic States in resolving their
conflicting water boundary and continental shelf claims is that some states
have declared exemptions to compulsory dispute settlement, which are
permitted by UNCLOS.171 Canada has invoked the optional exemption
under Article 298 regarding disputes relating to, inter alia, delimitations
involving historic title.172 Canadas claim that parts of the NWP are
internal waters is based in part on historic use and occupation of the sea
ice by Canadian indigenous people.173 Russia and Denmark have invoked
the same exemption that excepts jurisdiction over sea boundary
delimitations.174 Norway does not submit to alternate tribunals for the three
categories of disputes listed in Article 298.175 Even the United States has
suggested that it will exempt itself from the same categories in the event
166. Id., art. 39.
167. Julia Brower et al., UNCLOS Dispute Settlement in Context: The United States
Record in International Arbitration Proceedings 1-2 (Dec. 10, 2012) (unpublished student
paper),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/cglc/yale_law_school__unclos_and_arbitration.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZEX-PQJU]; UNCLOS, supra note 13,
arts. 286-87.
168. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 282.
169. Id., arts. 280-82.
170. Käpylä & Mikkola, supra note 34, at 7.
171. Féron, supra note 26, at 96-97, 104.
172. Id.; see UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 298(1)(a)(i).
173. Féron, supra note 26, at 92.
174. Id. at 104.
175. UNCLOS, supra note 13, Norway Declarations (Norway also has chosen to submit
only to the ICJ for dispute settlement regarding the interpretation or application of
UNCLOS).
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that it ratifies UNCLOS.176 While Article 298 requires parties declaring an
exemption to submit their dispute to conciliation if it is not settled within
a reasonable period of time, these contested boundaries have existed for
many years without resolution or submission to conciliation. The operative
question, then, is: how can the Arctic States settle these disputes and
disentangle them from their various environmental justifications?
IV. RECONCILING THE NEED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WITH
OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER ARCTIC COUNCIL
LEADERSHIP
Although a state has the right to ensure proper conservation of living
resources in its EEZ, UNCLOS directs that the coastal state and relevant
international organizations shall co-operate to this end.177 International
cooperationeven on environmental matters of concern to a single
stateis thus mandated by the legal instrument which the Arctics five
coastal states agreed in the Ilulissat Declaration serves as the applicable
legal regime in the Arctic.178
The Arctic States need not attempt to negotiate a multilateral treaty for
Arctic governancewhich can get stalled by bilateral disagreements
when they have already made commitments through treaties and binding
Arctic Council agreements. Using the tools provided by UNCLOS and the
IMO, the Arctic States can take specific actions through the Arctic Council
to enforce these commitments and regulate the protection of the Arctic
environment.
Despite U.S. comparisons to the South China Sea, the Arctic States
have been remarkably successful in [balancing] national interests and
peaceful cooperation to keep the Arctic stable.179 What the Arctic needs
now is a set of decisions by the Arctic Council which will move some of
the intractable disagreements of the Arctic States toward resolution even
if they are not immediately solvable in the short term.
A. Collective Action of the Arctic Council
Given the rapidly changing landscape and the legitimate basis of
environmental protection as justification for extraterritorial actions
codified in UNCLOS, the Arctic States need to work from a common set
176.
177.
178.
179.

Brower et al., supra note 167, at 2.
UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 61(2) (emphasis added).
See discussion of the Ilulissat Declaration in Part IV supra.
See Käpylä & Mikkola, supra note 34, at 6.
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of facts. As regional warming changes the facts on the ground, the Arctic
could become a battleground over competing scientific interpretations.
A common set of facts is not just an ideal policy, it is also written into
the text of at least one UNCLOS provision at issue. Article 234, which
extends a coastal states enforcement powers for the protection of the
marine environment in generally ice-covered areas also requires that such
regulations have due regard to [ . . . ] the protection and preservation of
the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.180
As states continue to chafe at the regulations imposed by Canada and
Russia, and potentially others, they could seek out competing science that
suggests the regulatory measures are unnecessary. This will become more
readily apparent as melting ice eases transit, and potentially removes
states justifications for environmental protection measures. Escalation
such as a ship refusing the escort of Russian icebreakers, and the Russians
possible responsesis not hard to imagine. The delimitation of a states
continental shelf is also a highly scientific process, in which slightly
different measurement points can have vastly divergent outcomes. With
the resources at stake, states have every incentive to use the most
advantageous measurements possible.
Through information-gathering and -sharing, the Arctic Councils
different working groups are positioned to provide these common facts.
The Councils research, which can be presumed to be accepted by all the
Arctic States, can provide the basis for joint environmental protections
enforced collectively by the Arctic States. It can also provide legitimate
grounds for new regulations which some scholars have recommended the
Arctic States pursue through the IMO.
Rather than throwing open the door to economic development, which
will inevitably alter the region, and trying to manage it individually on a
case-by-case basis, the Arctic States can establish regional standards.
Exerting regional leadership will have the dual effect of (1) reinforcing the
Arctic Councils role as gatekeeper to the region and (2) standardizing
regulations in the interest of promoting consistent, sustainable economic
development in line with the Ottawa Declaration.181
1. The Executive Function: The Arctic Council Should Enforce Joint
Environmental Protections
The Arctic Councils working groups have already developed a
number of policy proposals that could be implemented. For instance, the
180. UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 234 (emphasis added).
181. See Ottawa Declaration, supra note 10, art. 1(a).
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Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) has proposed
establishing a network of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), specially
managed ecological areas identified for conservation measures under
national laws.182 The proposal provides an overarching framework to link
nationally managed MPAs within the separate EEZs of Arctic States to
coastal and inland habitats, with the goal of harmonizing conservation and
preserving biodiversity in the region.183 The Arctic Council could turn
PAMEs framework proposal into a binding agreement, as one author has
suggested.184
Indeed, much or all of PAMEs proposalsand the proposals of the
Councils other working groupscould be made binding in a one-time
agreement to strengthen the working groups role as policymakers. While
some IMO conventions have been critiqued as unenforceable because they
are framework norms or norms not tailored to Arctic conditions,185 their
regional enforceability can be dictated by regional organizations.
Enforcement of these agreements, with special concern to Arctic
conditions, is squarely within the Arctic Councils remit.
Through the Arctic Coast Guard Forum,186 the Arctic States could
coordinate multilateral patrols of MPAs to enforce their agreed-upon
environmental regulations. Such patrols would replace more controversial
exercises of environmental jurisdiction by Canada and Norway. External
states are likely to comply with the Councils decisions given their
eagerness to join the Council as observers, which has leant legitimacy to
the Council as gatekeeper to the region.187
2. The Legislative Function: The Arctic Council Should Lead Efforts at
the IMO to Pass Necessary Regulations.
As for regulating shipping, Commander James Kraska, a professor of
international maritime law at the U.S. Naval War College, has pointed out
that SOLAS regulation V/12 allows parties to establish vessel traffic

182. See Féron, supra note 26, at 114; see also ARCTIC COUNCIL/PAME, FRAMEWORK
PAN-ARCTIC NETWORK OF MARINE PROTECTED AREAS 5, 6, 12 (Apr. 2015),
https://pame.is/images/03_Projects/MPA/MPA_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66HM-QVPW].
183. See ARCTIC COUNCIL/PAME, supra note 182, at 11; see also Féron, supra note 26,
at 114.
184. See Féron, supra note 26, at 114-15.
185. Id. at 107-08.
186. See supra Part IV-A.
187. See Stephen & Stephen, supra note 81, at 55-56.
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services where [ . . . ] the degree of risk justifies such services.188 Canada
could work under the authority of the IMO rather than trying to
haphazardly impose unilateral measures, Kraska wrote.189 The same is
true of Russia.
The Arctic Council might also draw lessons from similar water
management agreements. The governing body of the Panama Canal, for
instance, incentivizes shipping companies to use cleaner fuels by giving
priority to [] cleaner ships.190 Just as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore
negotiated a Cooperative Mechanism under the auspices of the IMO to
develop a governance framework for use of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, the Arctic States could do the same for the NSR, NWP, and
any other future cross-polar route.191 Similarly, the Arctic Council could
coordinate port inspection reporting through the IMO. In 2012, the IMOs
Maritime Safety Committee adopted a mandatory ship reporting system in
the Barents Sea, proposed by Norway and Russia, requiring certain ships
to report either to a Norwegian or Russian center.192 The Arctic Council
could organize an Arctic memorandum of understanding similar to other
regional MOUs193 to share ship reporting data among all the Arctic States.
Finally, the Arctic States could lead an effort at the IMO to designate
the Arctic as an emission control area (ECA) under Annex VI of
MARPOL, with stricter restrictions on certain emissions in specific coastal
areas,194 as two environmental law experts have suggested.195 Any
enforcement required could be carried out under the guidance of the Arctic
Coast Guard Forum. The Arctic States could even impose a shipping
emissions tax to fund the Councils environmental protection
enforcement.196
3. The Judicial Function: The Arctic Council Should Build Capacity for
Dispute Resolution
The Arctic Council grew out of informal inter-state collaboration on
scientific research, environmental conservation, and emergency response
procedures. Such soft law can create expectations, but not binding legal
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Kraska, supra note 6, at 1129.
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obligations. However, Council members have shown a willingness to
subject themselves to more binding agreements.197 In the interest of
maintaining stability, the Arctic States should commit themselves to
upholding the legal frameworks that already apply in the Arcticsuch as
UNCLOSand supplementing these with additional legal obligations as
needed.
First, the Arctic States should agree, in a binding document akin to its
2011 Search and Rescue Agreement and 2013 Oil Pollution Preparedness
and Response agreement, to abide by the decisions of the CLCS. Given
the number of overlapping continental shelf claimsand the highly
profitable resources at stakeother commentators have noted that the
CLCSs ability to issue binding recommendations is at risk.198 Because the
CLCS appeals process is unclear,199 intractable disagreements could ensue
if one state refuses to accept a CLCS recommendation. The Arctic Council
could avert deadlock, and ensure its own stability, by mandating
compliance with CLCS recommendations. If necessary, it could also agree
to an appeals process, such as submitting persistent continental shelf
disputes to the ICJ.200
Second, the Arctic Council should begin forming internal processes of
dispute resolution, such as an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration.
Notwithstanding their claimed exemptions to compulsory dispute
resolution, the Arctic States need not submit disputes in the first instance
to an external body such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea or the ICJ. UNCLOS Article 280 provides that states parties may settle
disputes by any peaceful means of their own choice. The Arctic States
could fund an Arctic arbitration process, potentially including consent to
ICJ jurisdiction for the purpose of appeals, to resolve territorial disputes
amongst themselves. Such a function could be managed by a body
adjacent to the Councils permanent Secretariat.201
More controversially, the arbitration mechanism could be given
jurisdiction over disputes regarding states environmental protection
regulations as a way to enforce the Arctic States collective environmental
regulations. The arbitral panel could assess whether certain regulations by
an individual state are consistent with the PAME MPA framework or
impermissibly deviate from it, for example. Where, as here, territorial
197. See supra Part IV-A.1.
198. See Nevitt & Percival, supra note 67, at 1693.
199. See id.
200. Such leadership would also provide a solution for the broader international
community in appealing CLCS decisions.
201. See Arctic Council Secretariat, ARCTIC COUNCIL, https://arctic-council.
org/en/about/secretariat/ [https://perma.cc/97GX-GXCA] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
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disputes are so intertwined with claims of right to enforce environmental
protections, the dispute resolution mechanismwhatever form it takes
must be prepared and empowered to resolve disputes over environmental
conditions and the consistency of purported environmental measures with
the collective measures decided by the Arctic Council. Those regulations
which are the initiative of a single state might then be suspect as pretense
for exerting territorial sovereignty. While the arbitration mechanism itself
may infringe to an extent on Arctic States sovereignty, this is an outcome
they may wish to accept in order to maintain their collective position as
manager of the Arctic region.
If given the legitimacy of the Arctic States participation, the
mechanism they choose could extend to disputes with non-Arctic State
actors. Such an Arctic-centric dispute resolution process will maintain the
Arctic States collective control over the region while ensuring peaceful
resolutions of disputes within the consensus-based framework of the
Arctic Council.
B. Individual Actions of the Arctic States
The Arctic States themselves should also prepare to actively monitor
environmental conditions in the Arctic so that they can credibly contest
assertions of environmental enforcement that are based on illegitimate,
faulty, or falsified environmental data. This will require intelligencegathering on more than just other states military movements in the Arctic.
It will also require intelligence-gathering on the Arctic itself: the condition
of the seabed, coastal erosion, plant and animal life, the existence of
pollutants, and the general health of the Arctic Ocean.
A number of Arctic States must also take actions to improve their own
strategic positions in the Arctic as well as the overall strength of Arctic
Council governance. First, the United States must accede to UNCLOS and
ratify the 1994 implementing agreement. Although it is submitting an
application to the CLCS as a non-party, the United States could remove
doubts that it will comply with the CLCSs resulting recommendation
and in turn, help legitimize the findings of the CLCS in other Arctic
disputesby acceding to UNCLOS. Joining UNCLOS will also reinforce
the Ilulissat Declaration, which the United States signed and which
declared that the law of the sea applies in the Arctic. As long as it remains
a non-party to UNCLOS, and can therefore avoid obligations under the
treaty regime, the U.S. position of enforcing UNCLOS in future Arctic
disputes will be untenable. Second, instead of unilateral action, Canada
and Norway should work through the IMO, where tough laws on marine
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protection can be replicated in a multilateral context.202 Finally, the 2010
delimitation treaty between Norway and Russia may serve as a model for
how individual states can resolve bilateral disputes to clear the way for
more concerted action on common issues challenging Arctic governance.
CONCLUSION: DEVELOPING AN ARCTIC COUNCIL STRATEGY
The danger of armed conflict among the Arctic States is very low. The
real danger confronting the Arctic is a rush for resources across unsettled
boundaries and Arctic States reactionary responses, all of which has the
potential to break down long-standing norms within the law of the sea and
expose the sensitive region to further environmental degradation already
heightened by climate change. Yet, assertions by environmentallyconscious states that they have interests beyond their borders will lead to
unpredictable outcomes where there are no rules to accommodate their
purported interests.
The Arctic States have signaled that they wish to remain the managers
of this increasingly complex region by progressively formalizing the
Arctic Councils structure. But to retain its leadership role, the Council
and its members will have to make commitments to each other and to the
international rules-based order. In practice, the Arctic States should treat
the Council as a regional security system, recognizing that their individual
economic and military security is dependent on their immediate
neighbors own security. In the event of environmental or natural disasters,
they will be more reliant on each other than on external actors. Clearly, it
is in the Arctic States interestsindividually and collectivelyfor the
Arctic Council to remain indispensable to Arctic governance and the sole
gatekeeper to the Arctic.
The Arctic States should be quick to prevent an incremental fait
accompli through the use of meritless environmental claims which result
in dramatic changes to the geopolitical environment. But they also should
not mistake defensive measures for offensive ones. Russia and Canada
both are experiencing an unparalleled shift in defense strategy as the entire
lengths of their northern borders become suddenly exposed to the threat of
armed force.203 Reestablishing northern bases is as much a form of earlywarning detection as it is an attempt at power projection. Canada and
Russia can be expected to continue asserting their claims to internal waters
or EEZ regulatory rights, respectively, if for no other reason than to delay
the inevitable transit or innocent passage of foreign ships along their
202. Kraska, supra note 6, at 1130.
203. See, e.g., Kraska, supra note 6, at 1117-18, 1124-25.
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coasts. Building trust through regional collective action in the Arctic
Council will ease these insecurities over time.
Together, the Arctic States should also make clear that the Arctic
Ocean should not be treated differently than other comparable bodies of
water under international law. It is home to a number of states territorial
seas as defined by UNCLOS. Claims, like Chinas, that the Arctic is a
community with a shared future for mankind implicitly undermine that
regime.
Yet, some of the Arctic States themselves are inviting outside actors
into the region in ways that serve the outsiders agendas. Arctic States
should be wary of outside actors large-scale investments which allow
them to wield outsized influence in the region. Iceland and Greenland have
welcomed investments by China.204 But those investments come with
significant leverage, giving a non-Arctic State a foothold in the region
which it parleyed into an observer seat on the Arctic Council.205 In a selfperpetuating cycle, outside states increased participation in Arctic
governance justifies their presence in the Arctic, which further justifies
their taking on greater responsibilities, which will eventually dilute Arctic
States power within this governance structure.
Expansive environmental protectionbased claims may also serve to
reinforce the justifications used by outside actors to claim roles in Arctic
governance. Indeed, outside states professed interest in conducting
climate change research rings hollow when it is self-evident that they are
lured to the Arctic by deposits of rare earth minerals and untapped reserves
of oil and natural gas.206
To be successful, Arctic States strategy for the Arctic must be valuesdriven, not interest-driven. As such, it must be removed from the parochial
concerns of individual states and based in upholding international legal
regimes. Canada should not use its indigenous population as a cudgel to
beat away compliance with UNCLOS. The United States should not
resurrect Cold Warera fears to stimulate, or perpetuate, an Arctic arms
race. Informed threat assessment and trust in the multilateral Arctic
Council framework, which has fostered collaboration for decades, will
help the United States and other Arctic States avoid an ideologically
driven blunder.207
A binding treaty to protect the Arctic environment is unnecessary
where cooperation among the Arctic States will not only fill the gap in
204.
205.
206.
207.
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environmental protections but also foster greater collaboration on other
issues that will inevitably confront the region. This broader collaboration
will only be helped by an insider-outsider mentality, in which the Arctic
States assert their regional authority over the Arctic Ocean as against nonArctic States rather than succumbing to competition against each other.
Reactionary cycles of escalation will not help the Arctic States ensure
environmental protections or sustainable development of the Arctics
resources. But trust in existing frameworks like UNCLOS and the IMO
and the Arctic Councilwill.
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